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FOREWORD
ROBINSON 0. EVERETT*

Recently I served on a nine-member committee appointed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist to study and report on the rendition of legal services to indigent
defendants in federal criminal trials. At one of the first meetings of the
committee-whose establishment was mandated by Congress pursuant to the
Judicial Improvements Act of 19901 and soon came to be known by the name
of its chairman, District Judge Edward C. Prado 2 -the suggestion was made
that some distinguished legal periodical be requested to organize and publish a
symposium on the right to effective assistance of counsel, as that right has
evolved during the three decades since the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon
v. Wainwright9 and the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act.'
To me, Law and Contemporary Problems, the originator of legal symposia,
appeared to be the natural choice to perform this important task. When I

transmitted the Committee's request, not only was it enthusiastically accepted,
but also-perhaps not unforeseeably-I was asked to serve as special editor of
the symposium that would be published. Fortunately, we have been able to

assemble here articles from persons with great insight into the major issues that
are being confronted in the continuing effort to assure that the constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel is a reality and not merely an
aspiration.
Copyright © 1995 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Military Appeals
(now the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces), 1980-90.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-650, S 318, 104 Stat. 5116-17 (Dec. 1, 1990).
2. Judge Prado describes the work of the committee in his article in this symposium. Edward C.
Prado, Process and Progress: Reviewing the Criminal Justice Act, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51
(Winter 1995). The reporter for the Committee was Professor Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., who also has
an article in the symposium. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New PublicDefenderfor the 21st
Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (Winter 1995).
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. S 3006a (1988)).
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The publication of this symposium comes at an especially opportune time.
Thirty years have passed since the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 was first
implemented, and it is appropriate to determine what progress has been made
during this period in guaranteeing the right to counsel in federal criminal trials.
Moreover, Congress and various state legislatures-with significantly changed
memberships as a result of the November 8, 1994 election-are now taking a
fresh look at some programs intended to enhance the right to counsel. For
example, the funding of post-conviction defender organizations, formerly known
as death penalty resource centers, is in jeopardy. A subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee wishes to terminate appropriations for this program;
and some state legislatures and governors are also attempting to terminate its
funding.
The American Bar Association Journalhas recently called attention to some
other topics related to the right of counsel. In its March 1995 issue, the cover
story, entitled "The Jagged Edge,"' concerned a Marine captain who, by
misrepresenting his qualifications, was certified to perform duties as a
prosecutor and military defense counsel in violation of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice6 and thereafter defended many service members without ever
having been licensed as an attorney. Subsequently, in the cover story for its
July 1995 issue, the Journal raised some fundamental questions about the
current system for appointing and reappointing federal public defenders.7 The
nature of these questions-which also were a major subject of consideration by
the Prado Committee--can be readily inferred from the article's title, "Unequal
Loyalty," and from this summary which appears on the ABA Journal's cover:
Tova Indritz is a casual, plain-spoken lawyer who was widely expected to be
reappointed as a federal public defender. But she wasn't. To her admirers, she was
punished for caring more about her clients than the courts where she practiced. To
her critics, she got what she deserved for antagonizing federal judges.8

The questions about divided loyalty raised by the failure of public defenders
to obtain reappointment are, of course, not unprecedented. For example, in
some assigned counsel systems, there are claims that judges have used
appointments as patronage, or because of favoritism for political cronies or
former law clerks, or to reward attorneys who, in representing indigents, do not
file too many motions or enter too many pleas of "not guilty." Indeed, when
Fred Bennett, one of the contributors to this symposium, was not reappointed
after many years of distinguished service as a federal public defender in
5. Lincoln Caplan, The Jagged Edge, 81 A.B.A. J. 52 (Mar. 1995).
6. 10 U.S.C. § 827(b) (1988).
7. Lincoln Caplan, Unequal Loyalty, 81 A.B.A. J. 54 (Jul. 1995).
8. I perceived some irony in the failure of Tova Indritz, the federal public defender in New
Mexico, to be reappointed after thirteen years of meritorious service in that position. She had been
a vigorous opponent of recommendations by the Prado Committee to remove from the judiciary the
power to appoint and reappoint federal public defenders. An additional irony is that, although the
ABA has promulgated Standards for the Defense Function which require separation of the judiciary
from defense services, the ABA gave no support to the recommendation of the Prado Committee that
federal judges not be directly involved in overseeing federal defenders.

Page 1: Winter 1995]

FOREWORD

Maryland, there were claims that the vigorous advocacy that he encouraged on
the part of attorneys in his office had annoyed some judges and thereby caused
the loss of his position.
Claims that assigned counsel have not represented their clients effectively
because of divided loyalty are familiar to me because of my own experience
with the military justice system. For many years, the military commanders who
appointed courts-martial and referred charges to those courts for trial also
appointed the prosecutors and the defense counsel. Because the commander
who convened a court-martial could in various ways greatly affect the future
career of the appointed defense counsel, many accused service members
doubted that their lawyers could represent them vigorously. In order to
eliminate this widespread perception, the Air Force and the Army in the early
1970s created independent trial defense services, which were designed to shield
military defense counsel from any kind of command influence.'
Issues concerning the scope of the right to counsel have recently been posed
in several highly publicized trials-such as those of 0. J. Simpson and the
Menendez brothers. For example, should defense counsel-whether privately
retained or court-appointed-seek to advance their client's cause by holding
press conferences or leaking information to the press? Also, to what extent
does obtaining a fair trial depend on the resources of the defendant?1" In turn,
if having the resources to retain skilled counsel is important in determining the
outcome of a criminal trial, to what extent can the government deprive a
defendant of those resources by forfeiture of the defendant's assets?"
For a suitable perspective, the symposium begins with an article by Dean
Gerald F. Uelmen, who takes the reader on a guided railway tour of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, making stops along the way to revisit such legal
landmarks including Nabb v. United States, 3 Powell v. Alabama, 4 Johnson v.
Zerbst,15 Betts v. Brady,16 and Gideon. 7 Near the end of the line, as it were,

is the Supreme Court's recent decision permitting government to reach

9. These military trial defense services are in many ways a model for providing effective
representation to defendants. However, up to this point, the Navy has not placed its defense counsel
in a separate defense service.
10. In this connection, I remember being present when a well-known defense attorney was asked
whether he ever defended indigents and responded that all of his clients were indigent-either when
he began representing them or when he finished.
11. In his trial, General Noriega was confronted by this problem since many of his assets were
forfeited. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Some recent United States
Supreme Court decisions seem to have restricted forfeitures of assets and may have alleviated this
problem for defendants. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492
(1993); United States v. A Parcel of Land, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
12. Gerald F. Uelmen, 2001: A Train Ride: A Guided Tour of the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel, 58 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Winter 1995).
13. 1 Ct. Cl. 173 (1864).
14. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
15. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
16. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
17. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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attorney's fees through forfeiture laws.' 8 Indeed, in that case the dissenting
opinion noted the restriction that this holding might impose upon the
availability of counsel for defendants charged with certain crimes. Dean
Uelmen speculates that, with the departure from the Court of the last justice
who ever tried a criminal case-Justice Thurgood Marshall-the train may be
reversing its direction as the right to counsel of a criminal defendant is
dismantled. 9 Dean Uelmen's concerns seem to be confirmed by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Nichols v. United States.2 There the Court severely
limited Baldasar v. Illinois,2 which had held improper certain uses of prior
uncounselled misdemeanor convictions for sentencing enhancement purposes.22
Under Nichols, an uncounselled misdemeanor conviction may now be used to
convert a subsequent misdemeanor conviction into a felony with a possible
prison sentence.23
In his article, Professor Fred Warren Bennett 24 discusses the implications
of the Supreme Court's recognition in Ake v. Oklahoma,2 that the assistance
of experts may be needed both before and during trial as part of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 6 He suggests that, in modern practice, a
criminal defendant denied expert assistance due to a trial judge's "miserly"
reading of precedent cannot be said to have had an adequate defense or to have
received effective assistance of counsel. 2 7 Bennett advocates the promulgation
of clear and generous standards by which a trial court should determine an
indigent defendant's right to expert services. 28
Several articles in the symposium discuss systems for delivery of defense
services in criminal trials. Certainly the system used can affect the independence of the defense lawyer and the perception of that independence. Likewise,
it can affect the costs incurred in assuring adequate representation of indigent

18. Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
19. Uelmen, supra note 10, at 27-29.
20. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
21. 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
22. I was interested to see the practical impact of Nichols in my own city of Durham, North
Carolina in connection with the practice of appointing lawyers for first time drunk driving offenders.
The local practice had been to appoint lawyers under such circumstances because of the possibility of
severe punishment in the event of future convictions. However, recently a lower court judge proposed
to change this practice-and thereby save attorneys fees otherwise paid to counsel for indigent
defendants-because he concluded that a first-offender would not be sent to jail and therefore had no
constitutional right to counsel. John Stevenson, DWI Practices Under Scrutiny, THE HERALD-SUN, Jul.
9, 1995, at B1.
23. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. 1921.
24. Toward Eliminating Bargain Basement Justice: Providing Indigent Defendants with Expert
Services and an Adequate Defense, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (Winter 1995).
25. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
26. The repudiation of the Frye test in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993) has broadened the opportunity for the admission of expert testimony and thereby has increased
the need for defense access to experts. Certainly the O.J. Simpson trial has enhanced public awareness
of the significant role that may be played by experts in a criminal trial.
27. Id. at 137-38.
28. Id. at 138
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defendants. Obviously, concerns about costs have mounted as crime rates grow
exponentially and the criminal justice system becomes increasingly complex for
many reasons-such as use of sentencing guidelines, greater dependence on
capital punishment as a deterrent, and more reliance on expert testimony.
John J. Cleary is especially qualified to discuss how defense services should
be provided. In the 1960s, while he served as deputy director of the Fordfunded National Defender Project, he pioneered in establishing programs
designed to enhance interest in the representation of indigent criminal
defendants. 29
Subsequently, Cleary served as the Federal Community
Defender in San Diego. In his article, he reviews the evolution of the right to
effective assistance of counsel and the advent of compensated defense services;
then he urges significant reforms, such as the total separation of public
Cleary emphasizes the conflict which is
defenders from the judiciary.3"
inherent in judicial oversight of defender services and the increased importance
of independence from the judiciary in light of the tremendous expansion of
federal jurisdiction over crimes; and he stresses that federal defendants must be
accorded this independence in order to satisfy the mandate of the Sixth
Amendment.
Of course, Cleary's view is not unique that "federal defenders must be
recognized as an independent structure if they are to have true parity, both with
their adversary, the federal prosecutors, and with the courts before which they
practice."'" For example, Circuit Judge Stephanie K. Seymour, a former Chair
of the Judicial Conference's Committee on Defender Services, has observed:
Although it may have been wise to place the defender services program under the
guidance of the judiciary in the program's infancy, logically the defense component of
our criminal justice system should be as independent of the decision maker as is the
prosecution. It is uncomfortable and a bit unseemly for the very judges before whom
the criminal defense lawyer must try his or her cases to participate in the selection of
that lawyer or to decide his or her compensation.32

As Judge Prado reports in his article, most of the members of his committee
also believed that there are problems in the present system of oversight by the
judiciary of the rendition of defense services in federal criminal trials.33
29. For several years during the late 1960s I was co-director of such a program, which provided
summer internships for law students from Duke University, the University of North Carolina, and North
Carolina Central University. These internships were intended to encourage the students' interest in
protecting the right to counsel and to provide them experience that would be valuable in representing
criminal defendants. At one point, we arranged for some of the law students to help prisoners prepare
petitions for post-conviction review, but unfortunately we had to abandon this aspect of the program
because of opposition from several sources.
30. John J. Cleary, Federal Defender Services: Serving the System or the Client?, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (Winter 1995).
31. Id. at 70-71.
32. COMMrrEE

TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JusTicE

AcT,

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO

REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, reprinted in 52 Crim. L Rep. (BNA) 2265,2287 (Mar. 10, 1993)
[hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].

33. The only member of the Committee who was satisfied with the present extensive involvement
of the judiciary in the appointment and reappointment of federal public defenders was the late Judge
George Revercomb, who served as a district judge in the District of Columbia Circuit.
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Currently, the appointment and reappointment of federal public defenders is
made by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the defender serves.
Policy at the national level is formulated by the Committee on Defender
Services, which is composed solely of judges and reports to the Judicial
Conference. Thus, the policy emanates from a committee of judges who meet
only twice a year. In turn, the recommendations of that committee are
considered by the Judicial Conference which usually meets only twice a year.
The members of the Prado Committee concluded that such a structure is not
effective. Relying on the importance of maintaining the independence of
defense counsel-and the perception of their independence-the committee
recommended in its report to the Judicial Conference that the judicial
involvement with defender services be sharply curtailed at every level.34 Thus,
at the national level, the Judicial Conference's Committee on Defender Services
would be superseded by a Center created to manage defense services and to
control the allocation of funds for such purposes. The governing board of the
Center would be appointed by the Chief Justice, but the members of the Prado
Committee disagreed as to whether that board should have any judges as
members. A majority concluded that-at least initially-there should be some
judicial representation on the board.35 However, four of the committee's nine
members were convinced that no judge should be allowed to sit on such a
board.3 6 Similarly the Prado Committee proposed that, at the local level, the
appointment and reappointment of defenders be removed from the judiciary
and placed in local boards-a system similar to that currently existing in New
York, Chicago, San Diego, and elsewhere.
As Judge Prado mentions in his article,37 the Judicial Conference did not
agree with these recommendations intended by his committee to enhance the
independence of federal public defenders. Indeed, these recommendations were
never submitted directly to Congress, for the Judicial Conference submitted its
own report to the Congress and did not transmit the Prado Committee's report.
Probably the Judicial Conference's position, which had been recommended by
its Committee on Defender Services, was based on two premises.
The first premise is that judges are in an especially favorable position to
evaluate the quality of representation. Unfortunately this premise sometimes
induces disregard of the danger that a judge's effort to monitor the rendition of
defense services may threaten the independence of defense counsel and produce
a lack of confidence on the part of defendants. The second premise is that
involvement of the judiciary with defense services is necessary in order to obtain
34. See CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 32, at 2265.
35. I was a member of the majority and believed that, for several practical reasons, it would be
desirable to allow some members of the judiciary to serve on the Board of Directors of the Center-at
least until the transition had been completed from the present system. In my view, thereafter the power
of the Chief Justice to appoint members of the Board would provide sufficient judicial involvement with
the Center.
36. This minority consisted of the four members with personal experience as defenders.
37. Prado, supra note 2, at 62.
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adequate funding for the program. Unfortunately, however, despite its best
efforts, the federal judiciary has enjoyed only limited success in obtaining
funding for the representation of indigent defendants. For example, since 1984
the judiciary has not succeeded in convincing Congress of the need to increase
the compensation of panel attorneys in other than a few districts. Hopefully,
even if the judiciary did not directly oversee defense services, it nonetheless
would not abandon the cause of obtaining adequate funding for the representation of indigents in federal criminal trials.
Consistent with the traditional independence of federal judges, the Prado
Committee discovered that substantial differences exist among federal districts
in their systems for appointing counsel.38 Some judges apparently emphasize
involving as many members of the bar as possible in defending indigents; others
rely on rotation of appointments among members of a panel of attorneys; and
still others make some effort to match the experience of the attorney with the
crime charged.
The system of appointments that I recall most vividly was one described by
a magistrate judge who, in a 1992 hearing conducted by the Prado Committee,
explained that in his district every member of the federal bar was on the list of
appointed counsel and that, to avoid charges of favoritism in appointments,
counsel was assigned on a strict rotation basis, except in capital cases. His
description led me to imagine the problem confronted by a young, inexperienced lawyer in that district if assigned to defend a complicated drug or moneylaundering case. As Judge Prado mentions in his article, his committee made
recommendations intended to improve the assignment of counsel; and these
recommendations were viewed favorably by the Judicial Conference.
Choosing the best system for delivery of legal services to indigent criminal
defendants is as important a concern at the state level as at the federal level.
Since the 1960s-when he headed a program in Boston funded by the National
Defender project-Robert Spangenberg has studied such systems; and, in many
instances, the Spangenberg Group has made recommendations to state
legislatures and courts for improving their systems of delivery.3 9 In their
article, Spangenberg and Marea Beeman describe the structure and funding of
the systems of delivery now in use at the state level, which include assigned
counsel, contract attorneys, 4° and public defenders.41 They warn against
contract systems that permit unlimited case loads or make awards solely on a
"low-bid" basis, both of which may raise constitutional issues as to the
effectiveness of the counsel provided. Spangenberg and Beeman also suggest
38. Even in districts with public defenders or community defenders, it is necessary to use appointed
counsel because of conflicts in cases involving multiple defendants.
39. Robert Spangenberg was a consultant to the Prado Committee, to which he submitted a report
describing some of the systems used by states in providing for indigent criminal defenders.
40. North Dakota's use of contract attorneys is discussed in Contract Counsel: A Different Way to
Defend the Poor, 6 CRIMINAL JusTicE 24 (Spring 1991).
41. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, IndigentDefense Systems in the United States, 58
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31 (1995).
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various reforms designed to enhance the efficiency and quality of defender
services.
In reading the article by Spangenberg and Beeman, I noted that in some
states the attorney who is assigned to defend the indigent at trial carries through
the appeal, while in others there is a separate appellate defender's office.
Cleary apparently favors the former approach because the trial attorney will
have the best understanding of the case. On the other hand, in the military
justice system Congress has provided for separate appellate defense counsel-an
arrangement which allows specialization and assures that claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel will not be suppressed. Surely further study needs to be
given to the merits of the two alternative systems.
Cleary also favors allowing some opportunity for the client to have a choice
of attorneys-as is allowed in the military justice system. Certainly having some
choice tends to enhance the confidence of the defendant in his lawyer and in the
likelihood of a fair trial. Moreover, there may be some instances in which
rapport between the defendant and his attorney may be impaired if they are of
different gender or of different race. Thus, whether providing indigent
defendants some opportunity for choice of counsel is desirable and feasible
merits further examination.
Heretofore, much of the discussion of delivery systems has focused on
theoretical considerations of assuring the independence of defense counsel.
These considerations may not be of great concern to legislators, who often are
urged to reduce expenditures for the defense of "criminals." Likewise, the
public may not be enthused about the expenditure of public funds for defense
services since many assume-probably correctly-that most criminal defendants
are guilty of some crime. However, perhaps the desire to curtail costs can be
rechanneled to produce changes that will yield other benefits as well. This has
sometimes occurred in the past. For example, after Gideon and Argersinger v.
Hamlin42 had been decided, some states lowered excessive maximum punishments authorized for certain offenses in order to reduce the need to provide
indigent defendants with counsel. More recently, some assigned counsel systems
have been replaced by more effective public defenders because it was
anticipated that such a change would produce economies.
In its recommendation C-1, the Prado Committee specifically recommended:
"Federal defender organizations should be established in all districts or
combinations of districts, where such an organization will be cost-effective,
where more than a specified minimum number of appointments is made each
year, or where the interests of effective representation otherwise require
establishment of such offices."'4 3

42. 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that, absent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense
without representation at trial).
43. COMM1TI'EE REPORT, supra note 32, at 2292.
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The Committee on Defender Services also has favored greater use of defender
organizations; and perhaps for that reason, a number of additional defender
offices have recently been established. Currently, with respect to number of
appointments, the Eastern District of Virginia and the Western District of North
Carolina are the two largest districts in which there are no public defender
offices but, whether for cost savings or otherwise, these districts probably will
acquire offices. Similarly, Congress and some state legislatures may be
persuaded that funding post-conviction defender organizations is a wise
investment because it lessens the likelihood of extensive and costly postconviction proceedings predicated on the claimed ineffectiveness of defense
counsel at trial.
Perhaps some recommendations of the Prado Committee which were
rejected by the Judicial Conference may ultimately be accepted by Congress
because of a belief that a better allocation of resources would result than under
the present system. My service on the Prado Committee-and previously on
another committee reporting to the Judicial Conference--convinced me that a
committee of judges which meets twice a year and whose members have everincreasing responsibilities is at a disadvantage in setting the national policy for
allocating funds for the defense of criminal cases and for achieving cost savings
without harming the quality of representation. Likewise, I suspect that the use
of local boards to operate community defender organizations may produce
desirable economies absent from some public defender offices, which the
judiciary oversees.
Ironically, fears about continued funding were a major factor in the decision
by most federal public defenders to oppose Prado Committee recommendations
designed to enhance their independence. One of their beliefs was that their
close relationship with the federal judiciary would help shield their appropriations from curtailment by Congress. Indeed, many federal public defenders
feared that if defense services in criminal trials were under the direction of a
Center-or of some other entity not composed of, or directly governed by,
judges-their funding would be subject to relentless attacks like those that have
been made over the years on the Legal Services Corporation and on federal
funding of legal services. Hopefully, the defenders can be persuaded that their
funding will not be curtailed if their oversight by the judiciary is reduced.
Costs of defense in criminal trials have significance not only to the legislators
who must fund the defense of indigents but also to those criminal defendants
who are able to afford counsel. For them, the cost of defense may lead to
financial disaster or to an unwanted plea bargain in order to avoid the cost of
a contested trial. Fairness to such persons requires substantial reform, such as
the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the streamlining of court
procedures to avoid unnecessary costs and delay.' For example, a court's

44. A prosecutor in my home city of Durham was criticized by some lawyers because he developed
procedures that were intended to make it less necessary for defendants to hire attorneys to represent
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exercise of its power to appoint court experts pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 706 or its state counterpart may reduce the need for a defendant to
retain an expert. Likewise, the expansion of discovery on behalf of defendants
may, in some instances, lessen defense costs. Of course, the availability of
experienced retained counsel may also be curtailed by the forfeiture or threat
of forfeiture of defendants' assets and by the filing of criminal charges against
criminal defense attorneys. 5
Although this symposium has selected for discussion issues believed to be
of a special importance and timeliness in the struggle to assure the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, many other issues also merit extensive consideration. One such issue was omitted here because of its extensive coverage in a
recent issue of Judicature. There Deputy Attorney General Jamie S.
Gorelick' and Professor Samuel Dash 47 present sharply conflicting views on
a recently promulgated set of regulations, which evolved from the "Thornburg
Memorandum" and concern the ethical standards to be followed by federal
prosecutors in their contacts with defendants who are represented by counsel.'
Gorelick takes the position that these regulations are needed and that the
Attorney General has the power to prescribe regulations that will be binding on
federal prosecutors and preempt conflicting state codes of ethics and local rules
of court. Dash contends that such regulations are an impermissible usurpation
of a state's power to regulate its bar and protect the attorney-client relationship,
as well as a violation of the Supremacy Clause.
Various other ethical issues concerned with the right of counsel also have
attracted recent attention. For example, what is the responsibility of defense
counsel with respect to incriminating evidence delivered to him or her by the
client? What should a defense counsel do if the client intends to take the stand
and give testimony which the attorney knows-or strongly believes-will be
false? How far can a defense counsel go in defending his or her client against
leaks of information by a prosecutor or by law enforcement agents? Ultimately
the answers to these ethical issues can be very important in determining the
scope of defense representation.
them in some traffic cases. Commendation might have been more in order.
45. Recently, three South Florida attorneys were the subject of federal indictments alleging money
laundering and related crimes. There were some suggestions that they had been selected for
prosecution because of their extensive and vigorous representation of criminal defendants, especially
in drug cases. Jim McGee, Playing Computer Cat and Mouse, Agents Tracked Cali Suspect's Moves,
WASH. POST, June 7, 1995, at A6. Of course, such claims are foreseeable, whether or not there is a
factual basis for them.
46. Jamie S. Gorelick, Justice DepartmentContacts with Represented Persons: A Sensible Solution,
78 JUDICATURE 136 (Nov.-Dec. 1994).
47. Samuel Dash, Justice Department Contacts with Represented Persons: An Alarming Assertion
of Power, 78 JUDICATURE 136 (Nov.-Dec. 1994).
48. Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994). The Criminal Justice Section
of the American Bar Association has been specially concerned with this issue.
49. The proliferation of issues concerning the right to counsel can be illustrated by a recent
experience I had while writing this Foreword. I received a call from a staff member in a legislative
office who inquired whether a judge could properly enter a sealed order approving expenditures for

Page 1: Winter 1995]

FOREWORD

Issues concerning right to counsel transcend national boundaries. The everincreasing mobility of our population makes more likely the prospect that
Americans will be tried in foreign courts, where counsel may not be provided.
Thus, it becomes important to determine under what circumstances foreign
convictions may later be considered for sentence enhancement purposes in
American trials-an issue which also has recently been discussed elsewhere.5"
Of even greater significance would be an examination of the circumstances
under which counsel are provided defendants in foreign criminal trials and the
scope of responsibilities of such counsel, when provided.51 Unfortunately we
could not arrange for an examination of that topic within the time frame of this
symposium.
Even though some issues could not be dealt with, I expect that this
symposium will prompt their extensive consideration elsewhere. Even more
important, I hope that the articles in this symposium will induce a greater
appreciation of the complexity of complying fully with the Sixth Amendment
mandate that in a criminal prosecution the accused must be provided the
effective assistance of counsel.

defense services in a capital case. In reflecting on this issue, I realized that conflicts between making
information available for the press and public and maintaining secrecy as to the activity which has
occurred in defense of the accused. The Prado Committee grappled with a similar issue when it
recommended that suitable orders be entered to prevent the prosecution from discovering from fee
applications and otherwise, the scope of activity on behalf of the defendant. COMMITEE REPORT
Recommendation D-4, supra note 32.
50. See Alex Glashausser, Note, The Treatment of Foreign Country Convictions as Predicatesfor
Sentence Enhancement Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DuKE L.J. 134 (1994).
51. Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement was probably the first treaty to impose
on the parties a specific obligation to provide counsel for foreign service members prosecuted in their
courts. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their
Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846. Subsequently, some other international
agreements have also granted a right of counsel for criminal defendants, see e.g., International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, § 3(b)(d), 9A. Res 2200A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U. N. JAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52. However, significant differences exist among the parties to international
agreements with respect to the interpretation of any right of counsel that they grant.

